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Abstract
When delegations to an assembly or council represent differently sized constituencies, they are
often allocated voting weights which increase in population numbers (EU Council, US Electoral
College, etc.). The Penrose square root rule (PSRR) is the main benchmark for ‘fair representation’
of all bottom-tier voters in the top-tier decision making body, but rests on the restrictive
assumption of independent binary decisions. We consider intervals of alternatives with single-
peaked preferences instead, and presume positive correlation of local voters. This calls for a
replacement of the PSRR by a linear Shapley rule: representation is fair if the Shapley value of
the delegates is proportional to their constituency sizes.
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1 Introduction
Shapley and Shubik (1954) advertised the Shapley value as “A method for evaluating
the distribution of power in a committee system” almost immediately with the value’s
introduction by Lloyd S. Shapley (1953). Their motivation included not only the
problem of measuring a priori voting power in a given weighted voting system or
in multicameral legislatures such as the US Congress, but they explicitly referred to
the design of decision-making bodies and asked: “Can a consistent criterion for ‘fair
representation’ be found?” (p. 787). This question was later taken up, and tentatively
answered, by Riker and Shapley (1968).
Numerous studies in political science, economics, and business have since invoked
the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) – which is simply the specialisation of the Shapley value
to the class of monotonic simple games (N, v) where v : 2N → {0, 1} categorizes coalitions
S ⊆ N as winning or losing according to a given decision rule. It has been used to
examine the division of power in committees, shareholder meetings, councils, and
assemblies or to assess the power shifts caused by EU enlargements, changes of
treaties, etc. See Felsenthal and Machover (1998), Laruelle and Valenciano (2008), or
Holler and Nurmi (2013) for overviews.
This wide application in power analysis notwithstanding, the Shapley value’s
role as a tool for designing political institutions is probably outshone by a fairness
benchmark which relates to the Banzhaf value. The latter was introduced to the game
theory community by Dubey and Shapley (1979), when they provided comprehensive
mathematical analysis of a voting power index proposed by the lawyer John F. Banzhaf
(1965). Banzhaf’s interest in voting power was sparked by the US Supreme Court’s
series of ‘one person, one vote’ rulings in the 1960s. His index was popularized in
later legal cases.
Without Shapley’s, Shubik’s, Riker’s, and Banzhaf’s knowing, an equivalent power
measure had already been investigated, and the question of fair representation partly
been settled by statistician Lionel S. Penrose (1946, 1952).1 With the newly established
United Nations in mind, Penrose studied two-tier systems in which constituencies
(members countries, states, etc.) of different sizes elect one delegate each to a
decision-making assembly. He explained how proportional weighting would give
voters in larger constituencies disproportionate power. Rather, the problem of giving
equal representation to all constituents is solved by choosing top-tier voting weights
1The measure was again independently proposed by social scientists Rae (1969) and Coleman
(1971). See Felsenthal and Machover (2005) for the curious history of “mis-reinvention” in the analysis
of voting power.
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such that the resulting pivot probabilities (i.e., Banzhaf value) of the delegates is
proportional to the square root of the represented population sizes. This result – re-
derived by Banzhaf (1965) and sketched by Riker and Shapley (1968) – is now known
as the Penrose square root rule (PSRR). It and the corresponding Penrose-Banzhaf index
became the key reference for many applied studies on federal unions and two-tier
voting systems such as the US Electoral College (e.g., Grofman and Feld 2005; Miller
2009, 2012), the Council of the EU (e.g., Felsenthal and Machover 2004; Fidrmuc et al.
2009), or the IMF (e.g., Leech and Leech 2009).
The PSRR follows straightforwardly from assuming that citizens at the bottom tier
vote independently of each other, with equal probabilities for a ‘yes’ and a ‘no’. The
objective is that each voter shall have the same probability to cast a decisive vote, i.e., to
swing the local decision and thereby the global one.2 It is often forgotten, however, that
the rule lacks justification if voters’ decisions are statistically dependent (cf. Chamberlain
and Rothschild 1981 or Gelman et al. 2002) or for non-binary decisions.
We here propose to replace Penrose’s binary model of two-tier voting by a
continuous median voter environment, also analyzed by Kurz et al. (2016). The
model gives a simple explicit micro-foundation for using the SSI rather than the
Banzhaf value in two-tier voting analysis. Moreover, one arrives at a linear Shapley
rule instead of Penrose’s square root one.
Our voters are assumed to have single-peaked preferences over an interval of
alternatives, not merely ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Their delegates represent the median preference
of the constituency in the considered assembly. This assembly applies a weighted
majority rule. One hence obtains policy outcomes which equal the ideal point of the
median voter of the constituency whose delegate is the assembly’s weighted median. If there are
many voters and the ideal points of their preferences have a continuous distribution
and positive correlation within each constituency (while being independent across
constituencies, as in Penrose’s model), then the probability of a given delegate being
decisive in the assembly asymptotically approaches the Shapley value of the delegate,
not the Banzhaf value. Because the influence of a given voter on the position adopted
by his or her delegate is inversely proportional to the constituency population – not
to the square root as for binary options – this implies: if voters shall have the same
indirect influence on outcomes, the weighted majority game among their delegates
2For odd population size ni = 2k + 1, decisiveness of voter l inside constituency Ci coincides with
an even split between the 2k other voters. The probability of this event, with individual ‘yes’ and ‘no’-
decisions being equally likely and independent, is 2−2k · (2kk ). By Stirling’s formula, this is approximately√
2/(pi · ni). Decisiveness of constituency Ci at the top tier is captured by its Penrose-Banzhaf index in
this setup, which must hence be rendered proportional to
√
ni by choosing appropriate voting weights.
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must have a Shapley value proportional to the represented population sizes.
This linear Shapley rule does not require strong correlation of individual opinions
provided constituencies are as sizable as in most real applications. The assumption of
some preference affiliation within the constituencies suffices. It seems at least as natural
as that of statistical independence also from a constitutional a priori perspective. In
particular, if all voters were perfectly exchangeable then there should be no objection
to redrawing the constituency boundaries. One could then design constituencies to
be approximately equal in terms of population size and the question of which voting
weights to use would become redundant.
The identified linear Shapley rule does generally not imply that voting weights
be proportional to population sizes. This holds only in the limit as the number of
constituencies increases (Neyman 1982, Lindner and Machover 2004). The analysis
hence strictly refines the simple intuition that ‘one person, one vote’ calls for weights
themselves to be proportional to populations.3 One should identify voting weights
such that the resulting majority game implies a desirable Shapley-Shubik index. That
is, one needs to solve the inverse problem of the SSI.
We will point to some more of the related literature on two-tier voting systems in
the next section and then present our median voting model in Section 3. We formalize
the fair representation problem in Section 4. The main result is derived in Section 5
and we discuss practical aspects of it in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Related Literature
Most research on the design of two-tier voting systems has maintained the basic binary
framework adopted by Penrose (1946, 1952), Banzhaf (1965), and Riker and Shapley
(1968). One major strand of literature – including Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981),
Gelman et al. (2002), Gelman et al. (2004), and Kaniovski (2008) – has considered
relaxations of the assumption that individual ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decisions are independent
and uniformly distributed. It has turned out that Penrose’s square root rule lacks
robustness. In particular, strictly less concave weight allocations are necessary if
decisions exhibit positive correlation within constituencies.
A second big strand has considered other objectives than fair representation. The
most salient alternative is optimal representation in the sense of maximal utilitarian
3Several other quantities are possible bases for apportionment, too, besides total population.
Alternatives discussed in the US Supreme Court’s recent Evenwel v. Abbott ruling include the number
of registered voters and the number of eligible voters.
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welfare. Barbera` and Jackson (2006) and Beisbart and Bovens (2007) derived that,
generally speaking, constituencies’ voting weights need to be proportional to the
expected utilitarian importance they attach to an issue. This means that welfare is
maximized by square root weights in case of independent voter preferences but by
proportional weights in case of perfect alignment within the constituencies. Koriyama
et al. (2013) relatedly considered welfare with the twist that a voter’s utility is not
additive across multiple issues but a strictly concave function of the frequency with
which the collective ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision conforms to the individually preferred
outcome. This generally calls for voting weights to be strictly concave in constituency
sizes.
Other studies have considered the majoritarian objective of selecting two-tier voting
weights which, in a suitable sense, bring the implied top-tier decisions as close
as possible to the decisions which would have resulted in a single encompassing
constituency, i.e., in a direct referendum. Clashes between the outcomes of direct and
indirect democracy – instances of the so-called referendum paradox (see, e.g., Nurmi
1998) – are impossible to avoid; a prominent case was the election of President Bush
by the US Electoral College against the popular majority in 2000. Felsenthal and
Machover (1999) have investigated the ‘mean majority deficit’ of a two-tier system,
referring to the difference between the size of the popular majority camp and the
number of citizens in favor of the assembly’s decision. Kirsch (2007) instead considered
the mean quadratic deviation between the shares of ‘yes’-votes at the bottom and top
tiers, while Feix et al. (2008) sought to minimize the probability of the top-tier decision
being at odds with the majority of citizens. All three studies identified a key role for
weight assignments that relate to the square root of constituency sizes if voter opinions
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). However, Kirsch (2007) and Feix et al.
(2008) give warning that correlated opinions at the constituency level may call for
proportionality to the numbers of represented voters. This dichotomy was confirmed
also in simulations by Maaser and Napel (2012) which left the binary Penrose-Banzhaf
framework. Their objective was to minimize expected distance between the positions
of the decisive delegate at the top tier and the electorate’s median voter in case of an
interval of policy alternatives.
For the same convex policy environment, which we will also study here, Maaser
and Napel (2007) and Kurz et al. (2016) have turned to the original question of
‘fair representation’.4 If the ideal points which characterize voters’ single-peaked
4Relatedly, Maaser and Napel (2014) have extended the analysis of additive utilitarian welfare
from binary to interval policy spaces in simulations. Cardinal details matter somewhat, but the
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preferences are i.i.d., fair weights become proportional to the square root of population
sizes as the number of constituencies increases. In view of asymptotic results by
Lindner and Machover (2004), this matches Penrose’s original conclusion even though
the respective square root findings obtain from the superposition of very different
effects. Crucially, voting weights proportional to constituency sizes quickly perform
better if positive preference correlation is introduced.
Laruelle and Valenciano (2007) and Le Breton et al. (2012) also have considered two-
tier systems for non-binary decisions. The latter investigated a setting where delegates
vote on allocations of transferable utility and the nucleolus of the corresponding
TU game captures the respective constituencies’ shares of surplus. The former have
considered situations where the space of policy alternatives gives rise to a Nash
bargaining problem with an implicit unanimity presumption. Their delegates need
bargaining powers proportional to their constituencies’ sizes in order to avoid biases.
Laruelle and Valenciano raise the possibility – but without an explicit model –
that the delegate’s bargaining power in the considered committee equals the Shapley
value of the simple voting game induced by a given weight assignment. Then unbiased
or ‘neutral’ representation calls for weights such that the resulting Shapley value is
proportional to the represented constituents, exactly as our Corollary 1 asserts below.
With this exception and that of Riker and Shapley (1968), the Shapley value or SSI
has so far, to the best of our knowledge, not featured as a benchmark for fair two-tier
voting systems – despite its frequent application in positive analysis of voting power.
Riker and Shapley provided no explicit mathematical analysis in their article. In the
wake of the US Supreme Court’s decisions in Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims, they
focused on the delegate model of representation where each representative acts as a
funnel for binary majority decisions in his or her constituency. They argued, but did
not prove, that a square root rule based on the SSI solves the problem in this model.
Much more briefly, Riker and Shapley (1968) also discussed the Burkean trustee
model of representation. In that, representatives are ‘free agents’ who “seek to satisfy
the general interest” (p. 211) of their constituency rather than the interests of the
winning majority. Under the ad hoc assumption that such a free agent’s SSI can be
divided among all his constituents in equal measure, Riker and Shapley concluded
for this case that a representative’s SSI needs to be proportional to the number of voters
in his or her constituency. Our analysis derives the same conclusion from an explicit
delegate model. The key distinction to the setting of Riker and Shapley (1968) is that
general pattern in the literature – square root vs. linear weighting rules for independent vs. correlated
preferences – is confirmed once more.
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we consider many rather than only two policy alternatives and incorporate preference
correlation at the constituency level.
3 Two-Tier Median Voter Model
We assume the same median voter framework as Kurz et al. (2016), and partly draw
on the presentation therein. Take a population of n voters and let C = {C1, . . . ,Cm} be
a partition of it into m < n constituencies Ci with ni = |Ci| > 0 members each. The
preferences of each voter l ∈ {1, . . . ,n} = ⋃i Ci are assumed to be single-peaked over a
finite or infinite real interval X ⊆ R, i.e., a convex rather than binary policy space.
The respective peaks or ideal points are taken to be identically distributed and mutually
independent across constituencies. However, we allow for a particular form of preference
correlation within each constituency.
Specifically, the ideal point νl of voter l in constituency Ci is conceived of as the
realization of a continuous random variable
νl = t · µi + l (1)
where t · µi is a constituency-specific shock. Random variable µi has the same
continuous distribution H for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, with a bounded density and finite
variance σ2H. The scalar t ≥ 0 parameterizes the similarity of opinions within the
constituencies. Voter-specific shocks l account for individual political and economic
idiosyncrasies. They are presumed to have the same continuous distribution G for all
l ∈ {1, . . . ,n} with finite variance σ2G. The respective density is assumed to be positive
and continuous at G’s median. This rules out the possibility of a gap between ‘left’
and ‘right’ opinions, which would generate a binary model through the backdoor.
Variables 1, . . . , n and µ1, . . . , µm are assumed mutually independent.
A given profile (ν1, . . . , νn) of ideal points could reflect voter preferences in abstract
left–right spectrums or regarding specific one-dimensional variables such as the
location or scale of a public good, an exemption threshold for regulation, a transfer
level, etc. Variance σ2G is a measure of heterogeneity within each constituency. Variance
t2σ2H of t · µi is a measure of heterogeneity across constituencies. Preferences in all
constituencies vary between left–right, high tax–low tax, etc. in a similar manner,
but the constituencies’ ranges of opinion are typically located differently from an
interim perspective. Still, all ideal points are a priori distributed identically, i.e., we
adopt a constitutional ‘veil of ignorance’ perspective which acknowledges that νl and
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νk are correlated with coefficient t2σ2H/(t
2σ2H + σ
2
G) whenever l, k ∈ Ci.
On any given issue, a policy x∗ ∈ X is selected by an assembly of representatives
which consists of one delegate from each constituency.5 Without going into details
regarding the procedure for within-constituency preference aggregation (bargaining,
electoral competition, or a central mechanism) we assume that the preferences of Ci’s
representative coincide with the respective median preference of the constituency. So
the location of the ideal point of representative i is
λi ≡ median {νl : l ∈ Ci} = t · µi + ˜i (2)
with
˜i = median {l : l ∈ Ci}. (3)
We admittedly put aside at least two practical problems with this assumption.
First, systematic abstention of certain social groups can drive a substantial wedge
between the median voter’s and the median citizen’s preferences, and non-voters go
unrepresented. Second, due to agency problems, a representative’s position may differ
significantly from his district’s median.6
In the assembly, constituency Ci has voting weight wi ≥ 0. Any coalition S ⊆
{1, . . . ,m} of representatives which achieves a combined weight ∑ j∈S w j above
q˜ ≡ q
m∑
j=1
w j for q ∈ [0.5, 1) (4)
is winning and can pass proposals to implement some policy x ∈ X. This voting rule
is denoted by [q˜; w1, . . . ,wm].
Now consider the random permutation of {1, . . . ,m} that makes λk : m the k-th
leftmost ideal point among the representatives for any realization of λ1, . . . , λm. That
is, λk : m is their k-th order statistic. We disregard the zero probability events of several
constituencies having identical ideal points and define the random variable P by
P ≡ min
{
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} :
j∑
k=1
wk:m > q˜
}
. (5)
Representative P : m will be referred to as the pivotal representative of the assembly.
5The constituencies could equivalently have multiple delegates who cast a uniform bloc vote, as in
the US Electoral College.
6Gerber and Lewis (2004) provide empirical evidence on how district median preferences and
partisan pressures jointly determine representatives’ behavior.
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In the case of simple majority rule, i.e., q = 0.5, the ideal point λP : m of representative
P : m cannot be beaten by any alternative x ∈ X in a pairwise vote, i.e., it is a so-called
Condorcet winner and in the core of the voting game defined by ideal points λ1, . . . , λm,
weights w1, . . . ,wm and quota q˜.7 We take
x∗ ≡ λP : m. (6)
to be the collective decision taken by the assembly. We do so also in the non-generic
cases of the entire interval [λP−1: m, λP : m] being majority-undominated in order to avoid
inessential case distinctions.8
The situation under supermajority rules is somewhat less clear-cut. A relative
quota q > 0.5 typically induces an entire interval of undominated polices, instead of a
single Condorcet winner. Still, representative P : m defined by (5) will be considered
to be the assembly’s decisive member. This can, e.g., be justified by supposing a
Pareto inefficient legislative status quo x◦ ≈ ∞ and that formation of a winning
coalition proceeds as in many motivations of the Shapley value: it starts with the
most enthusiastic supporter of change (member 1 : m of the assembly), iteratively
including more conservative representatives, and gives all bargaining power to the
first – and least enthusiastic – member P : m who brings about the required majority.9
So equation (6) generally identifies the policy outcome for the given quota.
4 The Problem of Fair Representation
The event {x∗ = νl} of voter l’s ideal point coinciding with the collective decision under
these presumptions almost surely entails that small perturbations or idiosyncratic
shifts of νl translate into identical shifts of x∗, i.e., ∂x∗/∂νl = 1. Voter l can then
meaningfully be said to influence, be decisive or critical for, or even to determine the
collective decision. This event has probability
pl ≡ Pr(x∗ = νl), (7)
7Note that for x∗ determined in this way, no constituency’s median voter has an incentive to choose
a representative whose ideal point differs from her own one, that is, to misrepresent her preferences (cf.
Nehring and Puppe 2007).
8A sufficient condition for the core to be single-valued under simple majority rule is that the vector
of weights satisfies
∑
j∈S w j , qm for each S ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}.
9Status quo x◦ might also vary randomly on X. Then the quantity pii(t) below captures i’s pivot
probability conditional on policy change. Justifications for attributing most or all influence in a
committee to representative P : m in the supermajority case date back to Black (1948). The focus on
the core’s extreme points can be motivated, e.g., by distance-dependent costs of policy reform.
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which depends on the joint distribution of (ν1, . . . , νn) and the voting weights w1, . . . ,wm
that are assigned to the assembly members. Even though pl will be very small if the
set of voters {1, . . . ,n} is large, it would constitute a violation of the ‘one person, one
vote’ principle if pl/pk differed substantially from unity for any l, k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Our objective of achieving fair representation can thus be specified as follows.
Given a partition C = {C1, . . . ,Cm} of n voters into constituencies, and distributions
G, H and a parameter t ≥ 0 which together describe heterogeneity of individual
preferences within and across constituencies, we seek to find a mapping from n1, . . . ,nm
to weights w1, . . . ,wm such that each voter a priori has an equal chance of determining
the collective decision x∗ ∈ X – that is, such that
pl/pk ≈ 1 for all l, k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. (8)
The model’s statistical assumptions imply that pl = pk holds for l, k ∈ Ci irrespective
of which specific G, H, t, and voting weights w1, . . . ,wm are considered. Namely, the
continuity of G entails that if l ∈ Ci then
Pr(νl = λi) =
1
ni
. (9)
So an individual voter’s probability to be his or her constituency’s median and to
determine λi is inversely proportional to constituency Ci’s population size. This will
need to be compensated via his or her delegate’s voting power in the assembly.
The events {νl = λi} and {x∗ = λi} are independent. (The first one only entails
information about the identity of Ci’s median, not its location.) It follows that the
probability pl for an individual voter l ∈ Ci influencing the collective decision x∗ is 1/ni
times the probability of event {x∗ = λi} or, equivalently, of {P : m = i}. Letting
pii(t) ≡ Pr(P : m = i) (10)
denote the probability of constituencyCi’s representative being pivotal in the assembly
for a given parameter t, a solution to the problem of fair representation hence consists in
mapping constituency sizes n1, . . . ,nm to voting weights w1, . . . ,wm such that
pii(t)
pi j(t)
≈ ni
n j
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (11)
Note that if the representatives’ ideal points λ1, . . . , λm were not only mutually
independent but also had identical distributions Fi = F j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} then all
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orderings of λ1, . . . , λm would be equally likely. In this situation, player i’s probability
of being pivotal pii(t) would simply be i’s Shapley value φi(v) (see Shapley 1953), where
v is the characteristic function of the m-player TU game in which the worth v(S) of a
coalition S ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} is 1 if ∑ j∈S w j > q˜ and 0 otherwise, and
φi(v) ≡
∑
S⊆{1,...,m}
|S|! · (m − |S| − 1)!
m!
[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)]. (12)
Yet, under the normatively attractive ‘veil of ignorance’ assumption that individual
voters’ ideal points are identically distributed, the ideal points λ1, . . . , λm of their
representatives will only have an identical distribution in the trivial case n1 = . . . = nm.
Otherwise, a smaller number ni < n j of draws from the same distribution generates
a sample whose median λi has greater variance than the respective sample median
λ j. Technically, pi(t) corresponds to a random order value where the ‘arrival time’
distributions are mean-preserving spreads of each other (see, e.g., Monderer and
Samet 2002, Sec. 4).
5 Fair Representation with Affiliated Constituencies
Kurz et al. (2016), for a simple majority quota q = 0.5 in the assembly, study how the
sample size effect on the realized medians gives a pivotality advantage to the delegates
from large constituencies. For instance, in the i.i.d. case with t = 0, n j = 4 · ni implies
that the delegate from constituency C j is twice as likely to be the unweighted median
among the delegates, i.e., pi j(0) = 2 ·pii(0), if ni is sufficiently big. A fair allocation then
needs to give delegate j only about twice the weight of delegate i in order to satisfy
(11). More generally, the observation that the density of the sample median λi at the
expected location of λP:m is proportional to the square root of sample size ni gives rise
to a square root rule as m→∞ in case t = 0. See Kurz et al. (2016, Sec. 4) for details.
We here study the case t > 0 and keep the number m of constituencies fixed. We thus
capture the realistic scenario in which a big electorate is partitioned into moderately
many constituencies. These differ not just in size but exhibit some internal similarity.
The key observation for this case of internally affiliated constituencies is that the
indicated sample size effect for the distribution of the median voter only pertains to
the idiosyncratic components of delegates’ preferences, i.e., ˜i = median {l : l ∈ Ci}.
In particular, ˜i’s variance is approximately 12pi · σ2G/ni (see, e.g., Arnold et al. 1992,
Thm. 8.5.1). This contrasts with a constant variance of t2σ2H for the constituency-specific
10
preference component.
The density function of delegate i’s ideal point λi is the convolution of densities
of a random variable that does not vary in ni and a random variable that vanishes
in ni. On the realistic presumption that σ2G is not bigger than σ
2
H by several orders
of magnitude, the distribution of the constituency-specific shocks hence comes to
dominate the distribution of individual-specific shocks as we consider population
sizes in the thousands or millions.
Since our model conceives of the population distribution n1, . . . ,nm as fixed, we will
not consider limits as ni → ∞ for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The phenomenon of t · µi’s variation
dominating that of ˜i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is captured equally well by letting t grow for
given (population-dependent) variances of ˜1, . . . , ˜m. We have the following formal
result:
Proposition 1. Consider an assembly with m constituencies and relative decision quota
q ∈ [0.5; 1). Let the ideal point of each representative i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be λi = t · µi + ˜i, and
suppose µ1, . . . , µm and ˜1, . . . , ˜m are mutually independent, ˜1, . . . , ˜m have finite second
moments, and µ1, . . . , µm have identical bounded densities. Then
lim
t→∞
pii(t)
pi j(t)
=
φi(v)
φ j(v)
(13)
where φ(v) denotes the Shapley value of weighted voting game v = [q˜; w1, . . . ,wm] and we
suppose φ j(v) > 0.
Proof. The proposition follows from the Shapley value’s definition (12) and the obser-
vation that the orderings which are induced by realizations of vectors λ = (λ1, . . . , λm)
and µ = (µ1, . . . , µm) will coincide with a probability that tends to 1 as t grows. To see
the latter, ignore any null events in which several shocks or ideal points coincide and
let %ˆ(x) denote the permutation of {1, . . . ,m} such that xi < x j whenever %ˆ(i) < %ˆ( j) for
a real vector x = (x1, . . . , xm). We then have:
Lemma 1. Let λti ≡ t ·µi + ˜i for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}where µ1, . . . , µm and ˜1, . . . , ˜m are mutually
independent, ˜1, . . . , ˜m have finite second moments, and µ1, . . . , µm have identical bounded
densities. Then
lim
t→∞Pr(%ˆ(λ
t) = %) = lim
t→∞Pr(%ˆ(µ) = %) =
1
m!
(14)
for each permutation % of {1, . . . ,m}.
To prove the lemma, denote the finite variance of ˜i by σ2i and let U ≡ (maxi |E[˜i]|)3.
We can choose a real number k such that the bounded density function h of µi, with
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i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, satisfies h(x) ≤ k for all x ∈ R. For any given realization µ j = x, the
probability of the independent random variable µi assuming a value inside interval
(x−4t− 23 , x+4t− 23 ) is bounded above by k·8t− 23 . We can infer that the event
{
|µi−µ j| < 4t− 23
}
,
which is equivalent to the event
{
|tµi − tµ j| < 4t 13
}
, has a probability of at most k · 8t− 23
for any i , j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. And we can conclude from Chebyshev’s inequality that
Pr(|˜i − E[˜i]| < t 13 ) is at least 1 − σ2i · t−
2
3 . For t ≥ U, we have |E[˜i]| ≤ t 13 ; and if
|˜i − E[˜i]| < t 13 holds then also
2t
1
3 > |E[˜i]| + |˜i − E[˜i]| ≥ |˜i| (15)
by the triangle inequality. Hence, the probability for (15) to hold when t ≥ U is
Pr(|˜i| < 2t 13 ) ≥ 1 − σ2i · t−
2
3 for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Now consider the joint event that (i) |tµi − tµ j| ≥ 4t 13 for all pairs i , j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and (ii) that |˜i| < 2t 13 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. In this event, the ordering of λt1, . . . , λtm is
determined entirely by the realization of tµ1, . . . , tµm; in particular, %ˆ(λt) = %ˆ(µ). Using
the mutual independence of the considered random variables this joint event must
have a probability of at least
(m2)∏
s=1
(
1 − k · 8t− 23
)
·
m∏
i=1
(
1 − σ2i · t−
2
3
)
≥ 1 −
8k(m2
)
+
m∑
i=1
σ2i
 · t− 23 (16)
for t ≥ U. The right hand side tends to 1 as t approaches infinity. It hence remains to
acknowledge that any ordering %ˆ(µ) has an equal probability of 1/m! becauseµ1, . . . , µm
are i.i.d. 
We remark that Proposition 1 does not require identity (2) to hold; the limit (13)
applies also if λi is determined, e.g., by an oligarchy instead of the median voter of
Ci. Moreover, it is worth noting that Proposition 1 imposes very mild conditions
on densities g1, . . . , gm, voting weights w1, . . . ,wm, or quota q˜: the Shapley value
φ(v) automatically takes care of the combinatorial particularities associated with
[q˜; w1, . . . ,wm]; and the convolution with t ·µi’s bounded density, 1t h
(
x
t
)
, is sufficient to
‘regularize’ any even non-continuous distribution Gi of ˜i.
Of course, applied to our two-tier median voter model, variables λ1, . . . , λm are
defined by (2) and ˜1, . . . , ˜m correspond to the medians of n1, . . . ,nm draws of i.i.d.
idiosyncratic preference components l. The proposition then implies:
Corollary 1 (Linear Shapley rule). If individual ideal points are the sum of i.i.d.
idiosyncratic components and i.i.d. constituency components with similar orders of magnitude
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then
(w1, . . . ,wm) such that φ(q˜; w1, . . . ,wm) ∝ (n1, . . . ,nm) (17)
achieves approximately fair representation for any given relative decision quota q ∈ [0.5; 1) if
constituency populations are large.
6 Discussion
Given a particular weighted voting scheme, various techniques can be used to compute
the Shapley value or voters’ SSI efficiently. Implementation of the linear Shapley rule,
however, requires solving the more challenging inverse problem: find a weighted voting
game that (approximately) induces a desired SSI vector. Specifically, given a relative
threshold q and denoting relative population sizes by n¯ = (n1, . . . ,nm)/n, the linear
Shapley rule requires finding a solution to the minimization problem
min
w
‖φ(q˜;w) − n¯‖ (18)
for a suitable norm ‖ · ‖.10
For large m the SSI φ(v) of voting game v = [q˜; w1, . . . ,wm] is often close to the
relative weight vector (w1, . . . ,wm)/
∑
i wi (see, e.g., Jelnov and Tauman 2014). Thus
‖φ(q˜; n¯)− n¯‖ tends to be small. So using population sizes as weights is a good practical
default for implementing (17).
However, choosing w = n¯ can involve considerable avoidable errors when m
is small, the distribution of constituency sizes is very skewed, or q is close to
1. These cases are prone to pronounced non-proportionality of voting weight
and voting power. For instance, there exist only 9 structurally different weighted
voting games (up to isomorphisms) in case of m = 4 and simple majority quota
q = 0.5. Numbers in the corresponding Shapley values φ(v) must be multiples
of 1/4! = 4.16¯% (cf. equation (12)). Exact proportionality to population shares of,
say, n¯ = (42%, 25%, 24%, 9%) can, therefore, not be achieved – one must live with
pivot probabilities which approximate n¯. Default weights (w1, . . . ,w4) = n¯ in this
example induce approximate pivot probabilities of φ(v) = (50%, 16.6¯%, 16.6¯%, 16.6¯%).
This is arguably not a very satisfactory approximation. In particular, it is more
distant from n¯ than φ(v′) = (41.6¯%, 25%, 25%, 8.3¯%), which would be induced by
10In the literature, the search for such schemes is usually restricted to the space of weighted voting
games. In principle, one could also consider the larger space of monotonic simple games. Neither is a
vector space. This makes the inverse problem much harder than for general TU games (see, e.g., Rojas
and Sanchez 2016).
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(w′1, . . . ,w
′
4) = (40%, 25%, 25%, 10%).
Weights and power sometimes cannot be aligned to population figures even for
large numbers of constituencies. In response to Riker and Shapley (1968), Robert
Nozick (1968, p. 221) pointed to the following example with q = 0.5: let an assembly
consist of any odd number of legislators representing groups of equal size, and one
legislator who represents a smaller group. Then each of the odd number of legislators
must be given the same number of votes. If the single legislator is given that weight,
too, he or she would have power in excess of the size of the group; if given fewer
weight, he or she would have no power at all.
Unfortunately, no useful bounds on the unavoidable gap to a given SSI target
vector are known. Simple hill-climbing algorithms often deliver excellent results and
good heuristic solutions exist if the relative quota q is a variable rather than given
(see Kurz and Napel 2014). Still, one cannot rule out that these identify only a local
minimum of the distance between the desired and the induced power vector. For
m < 9, complete enumeration of voting games is the best option. Kurz (2012) shows
how integer linear programming techniques can alternatively be brought to bear, but
exact solutions are computationally demanding for m > 10. Even exact solutions to
problem (18) may involve non-negligible distances: for instance, the Shapley vector
with minimal ‖ · ‖1-distance to n¯ = (49%, 33%, 9%, 9%) is (41.6¯%, 25%, 25%, 8.3¯%).
Figure 1 illustrates that the asymptotic statement for t → ∞ in Proposition 1 and
hence Corollary 1 are already of use for small levels of t. The figure is based on
weighted voting in the Council of the current EU with 28 member states under (a)
a hypothetical quota of q = 0.5 and (b) the quota q = 0.74 (260 votes out of a total
of 352) which was specified in the Treaty of Nice.11 The lines respectively depict the
‖ · ‖1-distance between individual influences and the perfectly fair democratic ideal of
(1/n, . . . , 1/n) ∈ Rn for weights following the linear Shapley rule (solid line) and the
simple heuristic of choosing w = n (dashed line).12
The linear Shapley rule clearly outperforms simple population weights at any
level of preference polarization.13 The gap between representation according to the
linear Shapley rule and perfectly fair representation narrows quickly as t increases;
11The treaty defined voting weights and a quota, and stipulated two other but essentially negligible
criteria. The Nice rules can still be invoked in the EU until March 2017, when they will be replaced for
good by the new voting system agreed in the Treaty of Lisbon.
12We considered l ∼ U[−0.5, 0.5] and µi ∼ N(0, σ2H) with σ2H = 10−8. Estimates of the induced
pivot probabilities pii(t) and hence deviations from the democratic ideal were obtained by Monte Carlo
simulation. We used the Nelder-Mead method in order to solve the underlying inverse problems.
13In view of the limit results by Neyman (1982) and Lindner and Machover (2004), it is noteworthy
that there is still a noticeable advantage even for the relatively big number of 28 constituencies. The
advantage can be expected to be higher for examples with smaller m.
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Figure 1: Absolute deviation from perfectly fair representation for directly proportional
(dashed line) and Shapley value-based weight allocations (solid line) with n1, . . . ,n28 defined
by EU28 population data. Panel (a) and (b) consider q = 0.5 and q = 0.74, respectively.
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it is already close to zero for t ≈ 10. One can also see that the lead of the Shapley-
based weights over simple population weights is more pronounced for the higher vote
threshold in panel (b), in line with our earlier comments on the inverse problem.
7 Concluding Remarks
When Lloyd S. Shapley and his collaborators contemplated the problem of fair
representation, they already mentioned proportionality to the Shapley value as a
possible benchmark. Riker and Shapley (1968) did not give it much emphasis,
however, compared to a square root recommendation in the tradition of Penrose
(1946, 1952) and Banzhaf (1965). The key reason to us seems their focus on perfectly
exchangeable voters.
This may actually be the most appropriate assumption in applications to, say, a
federal state with high geographic mobility, like the US. However, when constituencies
correspond to entire nations as in case of the Council of the EU or the ECB Governing
Council, voters in a given constituency tend to share more historical experience,
traditions, language, communication, etc. within constituencies than across (see
Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Many lower key institutions with a delegate structure
such as university senates, councils of NGOs, boards of sport clubs, etc. involve
constituencies (faculties, divisions, and so on) whose composition involves sorting of
like-minded individuals. Some preference similarity within and dissimilarity across
constituencies thus often seems more plausible.
Our continuous rather than binary voting model then implies that equal expected
influence on outcomes requires proportionality between a constituency’s size and the
respective probability – approximated by the Shapley value – of getting its way, i.e.,
of seeing its median voter’s preferences implemented. We provided motivation for
such proportionality by considering an individual’s probability to be pivotal in his or
her constituency, noting that it is the inverse of the respective population size.
This is not the only possible motivation for proportional pivotality at the top tier.
As Kurz et al. (2016) explain in more detail, one can also operationalize the influence
of a given individual by considering the expected effect of participation. Namely, every
local voter almost always has influence on the position of the respective constituency
median, and hence delegate, because abstention and consequent deletion from the
considered sample would shift the realized median position. For instance, if a voter
with an ideal point to the left of λi is removed from the preference sample in Ci, its
median shifts to the right; a faithful delegate will then pursue a position λ′i > λi
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in the assembly. The expected size |λ′i − λi| of such a shift – and also a voter’s
incentives to turn out – falls in Ci’s population size and, specifically, can be shown
to be asymptotically proportional to 1/ni. Therefore the same condition (11) follows.
Links from a constituency’s pivotality to electoral campaign efforts and pork barrel
funds also allow to arrive at Corollary 1 on equal treatment grounds.
In contrast to the square root result derived by Kurz et al. (2016) for t = 0,
Corollary 1 applies to arbitrary vote thresholds in the assembly. This admittedly
involves a weaker notion in which the representative identified by equation (5) is
‘decisive’ when q > 0.5 compared to q = 0.5. Still, it gives the linear Shapley
rule additional robustness, which is appealing in view of the widespread use of
supermajority rules in real decision making bodies.
At a normative level, the discrepancy between the findings for i.i.d. voters
and positively affiliated voters raises a non-trivial question of practical philosophy:
Which kinds of inter-constituency heterogeneity shall be acknowledged behind the
‘veil of ignorance’? Constitutional design with a long-term perspective should
arguably assume preferences to be distributed identically in all constituencies, even
though historical patterns may suggest greater conservatism, religiosity, etc. for some
constituencies rather than others. There may analogously exist normative reasons
outside the scope of our analysis for setting t = 0 even though t > 0 is more plausible.
Then, Riker and Shapley’s (1968) main hunch about proportionality of the Shapley
value to the square root of population sizes was right (at least for q = 0.5). Otherwise,
the linear rule which they discussed almost in passing provides the more “consistent
criterion for ‘fair representation’”.
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